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Have Civilising Processes Changed Direction? 
Informalisation, Functional Democratisation, 
and Globalisation 
Cas Wouters∗ 
Abstract: »Hat sich die Richtung von Zivilisationsprozessen geändert? Infor-
malisierung, Funktionale Demokratisierung, und Globalisierung«. With his con-
cept “functional democratisation,” Norbert Elias articulates how a specific type 
of “social equalisation” is connected to expanding interdependency networks 
and long-term civilising processes. This article initially focuses on connections 
between functional democratisation and informalisation, throwing new light 
on the wider framework of the theory of civilisation and informalisation, as 
well as on these processes themselves. These insights are followed by a discus-
sion into how functional democratisation and informalisation are intercon-
nected with social differentiation and integration as the two major process 
drivers of globalisation, thus illuminating directions of processes of civilisation, 
informalisation, and functional democratisation within the overall process of 
globalisation. Special attention goes to trends of differentiation and integra-
tion on the one hand, and integration conflicts or disintegration and defunc-
tionalisation on the other. Considering from a global perspective which side of 
these opposing trends is dominant helps to clarify directions in processes of 
(in-)formalisation and of (de-)civilisation. In addition, it helps to explain the 
declining power and status of the West as a global establishment, and changes 
in the balance of power between national and international political and eco-
nomic centres. Expanding global interdependencies have given rise to a variety 
of practical problems and theoretical questions – a major policy question 
among them: “How to steer clear of financial and/or political turbulence?” Is-
sues such as economic crises, global migration, and populism, brought up major 
theoretical questions: “Have the driving processes of differentiation, integra-
tion, and increasing complexity of social functions stalled, changed direction, 
or ceased altogether?” In other words, “Have civilising processes changed direc-
tion?,” an issue that was first raised in the turbulent 1960s and 1970s. Today, as 
strong spurts of globalisation give rise to feelings of loss and decline, it is reap-
praised once again in this paper.  
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1. Two Phases in Civilising Processes: Formalisation and 
Informalisation 
The concept of informalisation was intended as a better alternative to “permis-
siveness.” Whereas both in fact refer to the same social changes of the 1960s 
and 1970s, “permissiveness” emphasises only the “relaxation” in standards of 
behaviour. As such, these changes were welcomed by many as an increase in 
“liberty,” while others saw them as a decline in moral standards. The concept 
of informalisation provides a synthesis beyond this moral opposition. It 
acknowledges the increase of options and varieties, but does not interpret this 
increase as a “relaxation” of the self-steering capacity of individuals. On the 
contrary, living up to the demands of the relaxed standards of behaviour is not 
easier, but more difficult. It involves a rise in demands on self-steering capaci-
ty, not a decline. 
In the midst of the Expressive Revolution, Norbert Elias’s theory of civilis-
ing processes gave rise to the question “Has the civilising process changed 
direction?” Lively debates at the time formed the cradle of my theory of infor-
malisation, founded on the insight that more lenient and varied codes of man-
ners implied rising demands on steering capacities, the latter a continuation of 
civilising processes, the former a change of its direction. Accordingly, two 
long-term phases were discerned: first, a formalising phase in which steering 
codes expanded, gained rigidity, and became more demanding, subjecting more 
and more aspects of behaviour to increasingly strict and detailed social regula-
tions such as traditions, customs, habits, manners, and laws. Then, in the sec-
ond half of the 19th century, as social codes lost rigidity and gained plasticity – 
changing rather fixed socially learned codes in the direction of flexible guide-
lines – formalisation lost its dominance to informalisation. This ongoing pro-
cess of social codes changing towards greater leniency and variety once again 
increased demands on self-steering amid expanding possibilities and options to 
adjust more in a flexible way to changing conditions of life. Simultaneously, 
this process compelled psychic processes to be more versatile and more firmly 
dominated by consciousness. From a global perspective, we all live in a period 
of transition between two long-term phases of civilising processes, from for-
malisation to informalisation. 
Informalisation and what Norbert Elias described as “functional democrati-
sation” intertwine with each other as “diminishing contrasts” and “increasing 
varieties,” two key concepts in Elias’s synopsis of his theory of civilising pro-
cesses. Each of these four concepts – informalisation, functional democratisa-
tion, diminishing contrasts, and increasing varieties – refer to processes that, 
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seen from a higher theoretical level, are side effects of differentiation and inte-
gration processes (Wouters 2016). The next section presents a preliminary 
exploration of these connections. 
2. Functional Democratisation or “Diminishing Contrasts” 
and Informalisation or “Increasing Varieties” as Side 
Effects of Differentiation and Integration Processes 
In presenting the concept of “functional democratisation,” Elias closely con-
nects it to long-term processes of social differentiation and integration of social 
functions in which all groups and individuals have become increasingly inter-
dependent, coinciding with the reduction in power potentials between groups 
and a “diminishing of contrasts” in their conduct. The latter is a specific pro-
cess of social equalisation via “civilisation,” through the “regularity of func-
tional differentiation” within the West, as well as in the colonisation of land 
outside of it:  
[W]hat is taking place before our eyes, what we generally call the ‘spread of 
civilisation’ in the narrower sense – that is, the spread of our institutions and 
standards of conduct beyond the West1– constitutes, as we have said, the last 
wave so far within a movement that first took place over several centuries 
within the West, and whose trend and characteristic patterns, including sci-
ence, technology, and other manifestations of a specific type of self-restraint, 
established themselves here long before the concept of ‘civilisation’ existed. 
From Western society – as a kind of upper class – Western ‘civilised’ patterns 
of conduct are today spreading over wide areas outside the West, whether 
through the settlement of Occidentals or through the assimilation of the upper 
strata of other nations, just as the models of conduct earlier spread within the 
West itself from this or that upper stratum, from certain courtly or commercial 
centres. (Elias 2012a [1939], 424) 
I will interrupt this lengthy quotation to elaborate on 1) the meaning of the 
“upper-class function of Western nations as a whole” (ibid., 425), and 2) the 
importance of global changes in the balance of power between political and 
commercial centres for understanding more recent waves in the spread of 
Western institutions and patterns of conduct. 
1) Elias connects the rise of what he describes as the upper-class function of 
Western nations as a whole to the spread of court society (see also Elias 2006) 
[1969]. “In one form or another,” he writes, 
the models of conduct of court-aristocratic bonne compagnie have penetrated 
industrial society at large – even were the courts were less rich, powerful and 
influential. The conduct of the ruling Western groups, the degree and kind of 
 
1  Needless to say, this spread was at the same time a spread of colonisation. 
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their affect-control, show a high degree of uniformity despite all national vari-
ations; this is certainly, in general terms, a result of the closely knit and long-
ranging chains of interdependence linking the various national societies of the 
West. […] This court society exercised for the first time, and in a particularly 
pure form, a function that was afterwards transmitted in different degrees and 
with various modifications to broader and broader strata of Western society: 
the function of a ‘good society’, an upper class under pressure from many 
sides, from the organized monopolies of taxation and physical force on the 
one hand, and from the rising middle and lower classes on the other. Court so-
ciety was indeed the first representative of the particular form of upper class 
that emerged more clearly as, with the advancing division of functions, the 
different social classes became more closely interdependent, and as the num-
ber of people and the geographical areas that were placed in such interdepend-
ence grew larger. It was a highly constricted upper class, whose situation de-
manded constant self-restraint and intensive drive-control. Precisely this form 
of upper class from now on predominated in Western countries. And the mod-
els of this self-restraint, first developed in court-aristocratic society for the 
sphere of sociability, were passed on from class to class, adjusted or modified, 
like the upper class function itself. (2012a, 469-70) 
2) Changes in the upper class function itself as well as in the balance of power 
between political and commercial centres is the second reason for interrupting 
Elias at this point where he refers to “courtly and commercial centres,” because 
later in this article I will focus on these centres and on changes in the balance 
of power between them. These changes are a long-term continuation of the 
processes in which warlords and then courtiers became increasingly dependent 
upon people in the world of finance, industry, and commerce. During the era of 
colonisation, the expansion of “functional differentiation” in the West to areas 
outside of it proceeded from both centres, but in comparison to commercial 
ones, the powers emanating from western political centres clearly remained 
dominant until the era of decolonisation. Without a powerful army and navy, 
the competition for land to colonise could not be successful, and the manufac-
ture and transportation of colonial products also needed to be protected by guns 
and gunboats (cf. Linklater 2016a). Near the end of the process of decolonisa-
tion and early into the postcolonial era, the balance of power between the polit-
ical and the commercial centres shifted in favour of the latter, particularly in 
areas where decolonisation combined considerably with pacification. 
Since the end of the 1970s, the process accelerated when a deregulation of 
capital markets coincided with the transportation of whole industries from the 
West to cheap-labour countries such as India and China. The dominance in the 
competition for land shifted to a competition for money, and in this process, the 
dominance of the powers of “land lords” (aristocrats) diminished in relation to 
the powers of “money lords” (“moneycrats”), while the interdependence of 
both “lords” became interwoven. 
Below I will provide an explanatory sketch of this interweaving as well as 
the shifting dominance in the balance of power, particularly since the 1980s.  
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For now, back to the quotation elaborating the spread of Western “civilized” 
patterns of conduct over wide areas outside the West. Elias continues by ham-
mering out the point he is building up to, that functional differentiation, func-
tional democratisation, and “the spread of our institutions and standards of 
conduct beyond the West” cannot be understood through reductionism: 
It is not ‘technology’ which is the cause of this change of behaviour, what we 
call ‘technology’ is only one of its symbols, one of the last manifestations of 
that constant foresight imposed by the formation of longer and longer chains 
of actions and the competition between those bound together by them. Civi-
lised forms of conduct spread to these other areas because, and to the extent 
that, through their incorporation into the tangle of interdependences whose 
centre the West still constitutes, the structure of their societies and of human 
relationships in general is likewise changing within them. Technology, educa-
tion – all are facets of the same overall development. In the areas into which 
the West has expanded, the social functions with which the individual must 
comply are increasingly changing in such a way as to induce the same con-
stant foresight and affect-control as in the West itself. Here, too, the transfor-
mation of the whole social existence is the basic condition of the civilisation 
of conduct. For this reason we find in the relation of the West to other parts of 
the world the beginnings of the reduction in contrasts which is peculiar to eve-
ry major wave of the civilising movement. (Elias 2012a [1939], 424)  
The whole section from which this is quoted can be read as an example of 
“functional democratisation,” although the section was written in the 1930s and 
Elias did not introduce this concept before 1970. This section, entitled “dimin-
ishing contrasts, increasing varieties,” is the third of eight sections that make up 
Part Four of On the Process of Civilisation (2012a, 401-90), in which Elias 
presents his Overview: Towards a Theory of Civilising Processes. In section 3 
(422-7), he connects (1) the “mechanism of competition and monopoly” with 
the (2) “regularity of functional differentiation” and predicts (3) declining 
differences in power and conduct, and thus, as I will clarify later, he in fact 
specifies three significant and interconnected process drivers of informalisa-
tion: the rise to critical levels of (1) competition and co-operation, (2) social 
differentiation and integration of social functions, and (3) functional democrati-
sation in expanding networks of interdependency. Elias continues: 
Western people, under the pressure of their own competitive struggle, […] are 
making large parts of the world dependent on them and at the same time – in 
keeping with a regularity of functional differentiation that has been observed 
over and again – are themselves becoming dependent on these parts. […]  
Largely without deliberate intent, they work in a direction which sooner or 
later leads to a reduction in the differences both of social power and of con-
duct between colonists and colonised. (ibid., 425) 
Thus, Elias recognises the social inequalities that were generated by colonisa-
tion and almost in the same breath predicts their decline via functional democ-
ratisation. In this way, he builds up the following summary: “The contrasts in 
conduct between the [currently] upper and lower groups are reduced with the 
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spread of civilisation; the varieties or nuances of civilised conduct are in-
creased” (ibid., 426; italics in original).  
Elias explains what he means by “increasing varieties” not before section 6 
on “Shame and repugnance” (ibid., 457-63): 
[W]ith the advancing division of functions and the greater integration of peo-
ple, the major contrasts between different classes and countries diminished, 
while the nuances, the varieties of their moulding within the framework of 
civilization, multiplied. […] The more are the strong contrasts of individual 
conduct tempered, the more are the violent fluctuations of pleasure or dis-
pleasure contained, moderated and changed by self-control, the greater be-
comes the sensitivity to shades or nuances of conduct, the more finely tuned 
people grow to minute gestures and forms, and the more complex becomes 
their experience of themselves and their world at levels that were previously 
hidden from consciousness through the veil of strong affects. […] In the wake 
of this pacification, the sensitivity of people to social conduct also changed. 
Now, inner fears – the fears of one sector of the personality for another – grew 
in proportion to the decrease of outer ones. As a result of these inner tensions, 
people began to experience each other in a more differentiated way which was 
precluded as long as they constantly faced serious and inescapable threats 
from outside. Now a major part of the tensions which were earlier discharged 
directly in conflicts between people, had to be resolved as an inner tension in 
the struggle of the individual with himself. (ibid., 460-1)  
As I mentioned in my 1976 (Dutch) article “Has the civilising process changed 
direction?,” many, if not all, examples and developments brought together 
under the conceptual umbrella of “informalisation” can be interpreted and 
explained as a continuation of “increasing varieties.” Apparently, the processes 
of informalisation and functional democratisation are directly connected, root-
ed as they are in the same transformation of a whole social existence. They 
relate to each other as processes of formalisation and informalisation and as 
“diminishing contrasts” and “increasing varieties” within the same movement 
of the civilising process:  
It was at small functional centres that the foresight, more complex self-
discipline, more stable superego formation enforced by growing interdepend-
ence, first became noticeable. Then more and more functional centres within 
the West itself changed in the same direction. Finally, in conjunction with 
their pre-existing forms of civilisation, the same transformation of social func-
tions, and thus of conduct and the whole personality, began to take place in 
countries outside Europe. This is the picture which emerges if we attempt to 
survey the course followed up to now by the Western civilising movement in 
social space as a whole. (Elias 2012a [1939], 427)  
An additional argument, relevant for understanding what was to be summarised 
later in the concepts of “diminishing contrasts, increasing varieties” and “func-
tional democratisation” is that, with the differentiation of social functions, an 
“open or latent ambivalence” emerges in all human relationships. And this, as I 
will argue in greater detail in section 6 below, is a “basic condition of the civi-
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lisation of conduct” which at least partly explains why the level of functional 
democratisation can also rise together with functional differentiation in dicta-
torships or, in more general terms, in expanding networks of interdependency 
that are not ruled according to democratic principles.  
The term “functional” as a prefix to “democratisation” is used in contrast to 
“institutional democratisation.” “Functional democratisation,” the lessening of 
power gradients and social inequalities, is not related to the institutions of a 
democracy. They result from the blind long-term processes of differentiation 
and integration of social functions of various kinds (economic, political, affec-
tive, sexual, and so on) that people perform for each other and that link them 
together in the interdependency networks of their survival groups. 
This framework of connections and processes that makes up the “civilising 
theory” was drawn up in the 1930s, but until his death in 1990, Elias did not 
think that the processes of differentiation and integration of social functions, 
nor those of functional democratisation, had stalled or changed direction. On 
the contrary, he saw them change in the same direction. This is quite evident, 
for example, in his 1987 essay on the we-I balance (Elias 2010 [1987]). The 
process of informalisation has also continued in the same direction since the 
1880s, although there is evidence of its continuation as a spiral process of al-
ternating short-term phases of informalisation and formalisation, the latter 
consisting mainly of formalisation of previous informalisation – that is: refor-
malisation. In the 1980s, the strong wave of informalisation in the “Expressive 
Revolution” was followed by a phase of reformalisation. Reformalisation, 
however, is not a change of direction but a consolidation and integration of 
previously informalised conduct and steering codes (for empirical evidence of 
this, see my book Informalisation; 2007, Chapter 6). 
In the 21st century, processes of functional democratisation, informalisation, 
and reformalisation continued in the same direction, but as they differentiated 
further, generating a clear understanding of them became somewhat complicat-
ed because of a strong advance in globalisation processes. This apparently did 
not coincide with functional democratisation, at least not in the wealthier West, 
while China and India were booming. The advance in global differentiation and 
integration was accompanied by changing balances of power both within and 
between countries. It also entailed changes in relations between the world of 
money, involving functions that provide material security, and the world of 
politics, involving functions that provide physical safety via taxation. Since the 
1900s, in addition to these increasingly complex processes, declining national 
and continental inequalities coincided with a globally declining percentage of 
people living in “extreme poverty”: in 2013, according to World Bank studies, 
10.7 percent of the world’s population lived in “extreme poverty,” that is, on 
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less than US$1.90 a day (inflation-corrected), compared to 35 percent in 1990.2 
Changes like these further obscured the understanding of trends and counter-
trends – whether they can be interpreted as “functional democratisation” on a 
global scale remained difficult to assess. Yet it seems obvious that, at present, 
differentiation and integration of social functions are continuing on a global 
scale, and as such obliges all who study them to develop and maintain a global 
perspective. 
In this context, sociologist Stephen Mennell launched the concept of “func-
tional de-democratisation,” first in his book The American Civilising Process 
(2007) and later in two articles (2014a; 2014b). He raises the following key 
question, at least implicitly, if not explicitly: Have the processes of functional 
democratisation and informalisation changed direction? It is impossible to 
answer this question without knowing the extent to which these developments 
have extended to a global level. And it is also important to establish whether, 
where, and to what extent the processes of social differentiation and integration 
have stalled, changed direction, or ceased altogether. I would like to address 
these questions here. 
In an earlier article on “Informalisation and Social Stratification from a 
Global Perspective” (1990), I addressed very similar questions, although I did 
not use the concept of “functional democratisation.” This article addressed the 
connection between social equalisation or the decrease in institutionalised 
power differences – that is, in social stratification – and the spread of informal-
isation in the West. It also addressed the “debt crisis” and “the many who speak 
of an increasing gap between rich and poor countries.” This paradox provokes 
several questions:  
What are the factual processes from which this increasing gap between rich 
and poor states can be diagnosed? And to what extent will such a trend pre-
vent a global process of social equalisation and informalisation from becom-
ing dominant? Will the trend towards ‘diminishing contrasts and increasing 
varieties’ between classes […] continue on a global scale between states? 
What are the chances that the structured changes in the West will spread to the 
global level? These questions demand a comparison of the development of the 
relationships between the classes in the West and that between rich and poor 
states on the planet. (Wouters 1990, 70) 
I extend this approach here, but it is appropriate to mention a major difference 
between 1990 and now: the serious consequences of globalisation for Western 
labour markets have since become increasingly clear, and they were generally 
underestimated at the time.3  
 
2  <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview>. 
3  In my 2011 article, “How Civilising Processes Continued: Towards an Informalisation of 
Manners and a Third Nature Personality,” I also brought up questions from 1990, but be-
cause the evidence used was based mainly on studying manners books published in four 
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However, if these questions are addressed from a global perspective, in ad-
dition to informalisation and functional democratisation, two other side effects 
of social differentiation and integration come into view: integration conflicts 
and disintegration, including defunctionalisation. Before I get to that, I would 
like to focus on the introduction of the concept of “functional democratisation” 
because it is often misunderstood, as we shall see from the example of how 
“functional de-democratisation” was introduced. 
3.  The Introduction of Functional Democratisation and its 
“Counterpart” 
Elias introduces the concept of functional democratisation in What is Sociolo-
gy? (2012b [1970], 59-65), and he presents it as a cornerstone of his theory. 
The context is polemical. The “overall social transformation,” he writes, con-
tinuing his old fight against reductionism, is usually labelled by only one of its 
aspects, such as “industrialisation, scientification, bureaucratisation, urbanisa-
tion, democratisation or the growth of nationhood” (ibid., 59).4 Without a mod-
el of their interrelations, he claims, conceptual divisions such as these will lead 
sociology astray. The same goes for mentally dividing societies into economic, 
political, and social spheres, because these divisions obstruct the possibility of 
overcoming “the sociological problems posed by the common direction of 
development in many state-societies.” This direction “has to be brought to light 
not just in one sphere but in the all-pervading transformation of human rela-
tionships” (ibid., 59-60). A helpful question relating to this transformation is 
“What overall change in the structure of each of these societies has caused the 
ruling strata of previous centuries to decline in power in relation to the social 
heirs of those who were often referred to as the common herd?,” and another 
question: “Why societies oligarchically ruled by the hereditarily privileged 
were transformed into societies ruled by the recallable representatives of mass 
political parties?” (ibid., 60-1).  
In two sections of What is Sociology?, Elias discusses the trend towards the 
reduction of power differentials, distinguishing a reduction between rulers and 
ruled, and between different social strata. At the end of these two sections he 
introduces the concept of functional democratisation, but only after pointing to 
an inherent regularity, an unintended side effect that damages people, their 
functions, and power ratios: 
 
Western countries since the 1880s, the answers were mainly restricted to Western develop-
ments. 
4  Elias starts by re-humanising these de-humanised concepts, for example by writing “indus-
trialisation ultimately means nothing more than that more and more people came to be 
occupied as entrepreneurs, white collar employees and manual workers” (ibid., 60).  
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[A]gain and again in the course of social differentiation and corresponding in-
tegration, certain social groups have suffered reductions in the scope of their 
functions, and even total loss of function; the consequence has been loss of 
power potential. But the overall trend of the transformation was to reduce all 
power potentials between different groups, even down to those between men 
and women, parents and children.  
This trend is referred to by the concept of ‘functional democratisation’. It is 
not identical with the trend towards the development towards ‘institutional 
democracy’. It refers to a shift in the social distribution of power, and this can 
manifest itself in various institutional forms, for example in one-party systems 
as well as in multi-party systems. (ibid., 63) 
In the next sentence, which opens section 3, Elias highlights the importance of 
this trend:  
Central to this whole social transformation have been impulses towards grow-
ing social specialisation or differentiation in all social activities. Correspond-
ing to these have been impulses towards integration of the specialised activi-
ties – integration that has often lagged behind the differentiation. […] Because 
of their particular specialised functions, all groups and individuals become 
more and more functionally dependent on more and more others. (ibid., 63-4)  
In section 4, Elias focuses on two types of intellectual orientation – the scien-
tific and the ideological – that have usually developed in close association with 
this transformation. Referring to the structural properties which enabled people 
to become aware of themselves as societies, he writes:  
Paramount among them is functional democratisation, the narrowing of power 
differentials and development towards a less uneven distribution of power 
chances; it permeates the whole gamut of social bonds, although there are im-
pulses simultaneously running counter to this trend. (ibid., 64-5)  
After having introduced “functional democratisation” in What is Sociology?, 
Elias continues to use the concept, but with little clarification, and at times 
almost casually, without reference to what he here describes as “central to this 
whole social transformation”: the “growing social specialisation or differentia-
tion in all social activities.” For example, when he writes, “the thrust towards 
diminishing the power gradient between rulers and ruled, between the entire 
state establishment and the great mass of outsiders” (2013a, 34), he no longer 
explains why this democratisation is “functional.” It then apparently turns into 
“the equalising process,” usually along with hints at impulses and processes 
“simultaneously running counter to this trend.” 
These quotations from Elias’s introduction of functional democratisation re-
veal he is open to part-processes of disintegration that accompanied functional 
democratisation and social integration. Accordingly, he takes care to present 
both equalisation and its counter-trend, for example, by first drawing attention 
to social groups that suffered reductions or even total loss of function and pow-
er potential, before continuing: “but the overall trend of the transformation was 
to reduce all power potentials between different groups, even down to those 
between men and women, parents and children” (ibid., 63). Thus, he clearly 
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presents “functional democratisation” as a balance-concept,5 raising the ques-
tion of how strong the impulses and processes towards increasing social ine-
quality have actually been and, more specifically, which people and groups in 
fact “suffer reductions or even a total loss of function and power potential.”  
Only with a balance-concept like this is it possible to grasp that as networks 
of interdependency expand and become denser, both social equality and ine-
quality tend to increase, and that “functional democratisation” is compatible 
with increasing social inequality. As the differentiation of social functions and 
organisations proceeded and expanded, sooner or later this was followed by 
their coordination/integration at more and higher levels. On the one hand, these 
processes implied decreasing inequalities via functional democratisation, a 
process in which the bonds between the people involved became more dense 
and intense and with less social and psychic distance between them. On the 
other hand, inequalities also increased, if only because the co-ordination and 
administration of multi-levelled social organisations implied a longer and 
steeper hierarchy, and usually also because some people and their groups “suf-
fer reductions or even total loss of function and power potential.” The key 
question is which side becomes dominant – equalisation, or its opposite? So 
questions that would help to avoid short-sightedness are: “Which side is domi-
nant from a short-term perspective and (also) from a long-term perspective?” 
and “Which side is dominant in its scope for action and its corresponding levels 
of integration and complexity?” 
The importance of these questions is highlighted by Elias’s article on “social 
processes” in which he calls universal progress a myth. He grounds this remark 
in the example of “weapons and tools, which gave a particular society ad-
vantages in struggles for survival with other groups and with non-human na-
ture,” but “groups which did not adopt them were defeated and disappeared. In 
retrospect,” he adds, “people see only the apparent smooth progress of technol-
ogy, and not the elimination struggles behind it, which consume human beings” 
(2009c [1986], 8). 
In tacit agreement with Elias, Eric Dunning writes polemically about Émile 
Durkheim, whose analysis of the division of labour:  
contains a fundamental flaw that derives from his failure to recognise that 
functional interdependence or division of labour does not lead necessarily to 
harmonious and co-operative integration but is conducive, even in its ‘normal’ 
forms, to conflict and antagonism. In short, his concept of the society based on 
‘organic solidarity’ is Utopian. (Dunning 2008 [1979], 216-7) 
In other words, Durkheim presents a one-dimensional view of the connection 
between lengthening chains of interdependency and social equalisation.  
 
5  For more on balance-concepts, see Wouters 2019a. 
HSR 45 (2020) 2  │  304 
In the section entitled “Functional de-democratisation” of his book on The 
American Civilizing Process, Stephen Mennell draws attention to the 20th-
century trends toward social equalisation and informalisation,  
[which] from some standpoints may appear the dominant feature of the last 
century. In the counterpoint of history, however, they can be interwoven with 
contrary trends. Elias paid less attention to the possibility of what may be 
called functional de-democratisation and its effects. Yet in his writings and 
those of subsequent researchers who have followed his lead, there are im-
portant clues as to the genesis and consequences of functional de-
democratisation. (2007, 311) 
However, the “important clues” he mentions remain concealed and unspecified. 
Mennell abstains from further clarification. While he does refer to “increasing 
disparities in wealth and power,” Mennell does not specify the relation between 
these disparities and the italicised concept. At the end of his discussion of the 
“economic crisis” since 2007/2008, Mennell again raises  
some points of criticism or clarification about Elias’s ideas, particularly about 
[…] the confidence he often expressed that the overall trend of human society 
was towards longer chains of interdependence, which would tend to bring 
with them relatively more equal power ratios between the various links in the 
chain – ‘functional democratisation’. (2014a, 2) 
Mennell jumps to the conclusion that when it comes to today’s expanding 
interdependency networks, “in important respects the big picture is of function-
al de-democratisation.” In an even stronger formulation he writes: “on the 
larger scale, there are very powerful forces of functional de-democratisation at 
work.” Again, these “powerful forces” remain unspecified. Instead, Mennell 
draws attention to “the financiers and their political allies,” who “increasingly 
see the need neither to pay their taxes nor to compare their remuneration with 
that of their fellow countrymen and countrywomen,” arguing that balances of 
power between upper and lower strata “appear to be tipping back in favour of 
the more privileged, and global interdependences are increasingly interwoven 
with countries’ internal power ratios” (ibid., 12).  
In his article “Globalisation and the ‘American Dream,’ ” Mennell uses Eli-
as’s term “polyphony of history,” commenting that Elias “would not have been 
surprised to find that early in the twenty-first century alongside continuing 
strands of functional democratisation there is evidence of the growing strength 
of the opposite: what I have labelled ‘functional de-democratisation’” (2014b).6 
He then goes on to provide evidence of “increasing inequality in America,” 
which he uses to justify this “label.”  
The observation that increasing global interdependence coincides with 
growing inequality in nation-states seems accurate, at least in some states. But 
Mennell only backs this up with a rather casual moral argument, and by de-
ploying Elias as a source of authority. Both this “authority argument” to legiti-
 
6  <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0003.206>. 
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mise his “label” and his “correction” of Elias suggest that Mennell is standing 
on the shoulders of the great sociologist, but because he does not clarify what 
he means by de-democratisation, nor what is “functional” about it, many ques-
tions remain unanswered. In what sense is this de-democratisation functional?7 
Does the word “functional” keep the same meaning when wedded to democra-
tisation and de-democratisation?8 And if it is the counterpart of “functional 
democratisation,” as Mennell claims, should it not be called “defunctional de-
democratisation”? How and to what extent is this concept related to rising 
social inequality, and on what scale do these processes occur? Is it really “the 
big picture,” or is it mainly big in the USA? These questions are not raised, 
suggesting his perspective more Western than global. This critique also applies 
to the articles of sociologists Nico Wilterdink and Behrouz Alikhani in the 
journal Historical Social Research (2017), for they adopt the term “functional 
de-democratisation” together with a largely western-centred perspective on 
globalisation.9 What these three sociologists have in common is that they ig-
nore the possibility that, when industries, capital, and commerce were moved to 
cheap-labour countries, functional democratisation continued on the corre-
sponding higher (global) level of integration, while being accompanied (also or 
particularly) in expensive-labour countries with defunctionalisation, integration 
conflicts, and disintegration. The continuation on a higher integrative level 
implies that the questions regarding the projected dominant direction of these 
changes – whether they represent a trend towards social equality and/or social 
inequality – only make sense if they are raised and answered from a global 
 
7  Many thanks to Stephen Vertigans for this observation.  
8  Many thanks to Andrew Linklater for this question. 
9  Wilterdink does not focus on whether functional democratisation or functional differentia-
tion and integration have become dominant global trends. He does not understand “func-
tional democratisation” as a balance-concept and seems more concerned with developing 
concepts with a universal and therefore timeless validity: “If there is a connection between 
functional differentiation and growing networks of interdependence on the one hand and 
decreasing inequality of power and privileges on the other,” he writes, “it is apparently valid 
for only specific historical periods under specific conditions” (2017, 29). The word “only” in 
this sentence suggests a deficiency, but a social science that aims for timeless universal 
truths is surely deficient. Social developments and connections can only be understood and 
explained from their specific historical period and specific conditions. Replacing the word 
“valid” for the word “dominant” would change the meaning of the sentence in this direc-
tion, but it would still not rise beyond a truism. Both “validity” and “dominance” will always 
be dependent on “specific conditions” in specific periods. Only these can explain their rise to 
dominance and/or their becoming dominated by defunctionalisation and/or disintegration.  
Alikhani discusses “the ongoing translation of economic power into political power and vice 
versa,” and in this context he mentions Mennell and Wilterdink because they also “made use 
of the concept of ‘functional de-democratisation’ to grasp the direction of such transfor-
mations in US society and politics” (ibid., 198). Later, he dropped the word “functional” and 
thus the term “de-democratisation” came to designate the object of his research into cur-
rent political processes that others also refer to as “post-democratic.”  
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perspective. To what extent has functional democratisation continued on a 
global level? And where and how was the spurt of globalisation accompanied 
with defunctionalisation, integration conflicts, and disintegration? 
Seen from the global perspective of an ongoing and encompassing global in-
tertwining of functional interdependency networks, an explanation of the rise 
of social inequalities such as those in the USA in terms of a shrivelling of these 
networks is inconceivable. In fact these networks continued to expand across 
the globe, increasing in strength and density, changing the balance of power 
between all parties involved, including the balance of power between the world 
of commerce and the world of politics. Since the rise of social inequalities 
cannot be explained by shrinking networks of functional interdependency, we 
must look for an explanation elsewhere. 
To link the dubious concept of functional de-democratisation to the rise of 
social inequalities, suggesting it has similar explanatory power as its counter-
part of “functional democratisation” is a theoretical error that stems mainly 
from a one-dimensional view of the connection between lengthening chains of 
interdependency and social equalisation. It is one-sided for the same reason that 
Eric Dunning criticised Durkheim, which is that it turns a blind eye to the flip 
side of differentiation and integration: the unintended side effects of integration 
conflicts and disintegration processes, including defunctionalisation.  
It seems clear that functional differentiation and integration processes have 
not reached a relative stability on a higher integrative (global) level, and that it 
remains difficult – and therefore a matter of dispute – to establish whether or 
indeed when a further step in the processes of functional democratisation and 
informalisation becomes dominant. However, for the same reason it is mis-
guided to interpret the rise of social inequalities in large parts of the rich West-
ern world in terms of “functional de-democratisation.” 
Expanding interdependencies do not by definition lead to decreasing power 
differences, and we should not expect that to happen with necessity or certain-
ty, or immediately or automatically. They may be restricted to limited areas and 
levels, and not occur at all in others. They may also trigger integration conflicts 
and processes of disintegration and defunctionalisation, involving smaller or 
larger groups of people. Therefore, the theory and analysis of functional de-
mocratisation and informalisation calls for a sharp focus on which areas and 
levels of integration are involved, as well as levels of disintegration, and the 
tension-balance between the two. Both emerge as side effects of the differentia-
tion, integration, and increasing complexity of social functions. They are “side 
effects” because, seen from the perspective of “big history” and human history 
as a whole, the processes of differentiation, integration, and increasing com-
plexity have developed in the same direction, and thus have remained dominant 
process drivers. 
It is important to integrate part-processes of disintegration, defunctionalisa-
tion, and integration conflicts into a theory of long-term functional democrati-
sation because both trends – decreasing inequalities via functional democratisa-
tion as well as increasing inequalities via defunctionalisation and disintegration 
HSR 45 (2020) 2  │  307 
– have occurred throughout human history as two unintended side-effects of 
social differentiation and integration.  
4.  Processes of Integration with Part-Processes of 
Disintegration and Defunctionalisation as Unintended 
Side Effects: Examples on Various Levels 
From the earliest regimes of fire and agrarian production, human organisations 
expanded and became increasingly interdependent via differentiation and inte-
gration of social activities or functions. Some groups have lost their power 
potential because they lagged behind in the specialisation or differentiation of 
functions and/or because they could not make their social organisation strong 
and competitive enough to prevent them from losing power and survival 
chances. 
In these processes, whole survival units – including state societies – appar-
ently lost functions and defunctionalised to the extent that they became, or 
were perceived to become, what are known today as “failed states.” Examples 
include Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. From this perspective, the European refu-
gee crisis since 2015 – most refugees fled these three countries – is an example 
of part-processes of disintegration and defunctionalisation which are unintend-
ed side effects that damage people, their functions, and their property. Elias 
writes about the defunctionalisation of priests, knights, and kings, “the defunc-
tionalizing of the family by the state,” and he also presents a more general 
statement:  
A defunctionalisation of existing specialisms can be observed again and again 
in the course of social development. They may be restricted to specific en-
claves of the structure of social functions as in the case, for example, when 
handloom weavers are defunctionalized by factory production using mechani-
cal looms [...] It may comprise the whole function-structure of an integrated 
social unit [...]. In the territories of the former Western [Roman] Empire, this 
trend towards the contradiction of differentiation, towards the defunctionalisa-
tion of previously existing specialisms reached its high point in the early feu-
dal societies. (Elias 2009d [1977], 29) 
However, among the groups that succeeded to survive, defunctionalisation and 
growing inequalities did not, on the whole, rise to dominance over “functional 
democratisation” – the growing equality that accompanies the expansion and 
strengthening of interdependency networks. As all groups and individuals 
became more and more functionally dependent on more and more others, all 
people bonded in such a network will have become less inclined to use vio-
lence for solving conflicts or to use other forms of constraints that would dis-
turb the mutual interests of their bonds – including hierarchical ones – as these 
interests and bonds will have found a well-grounded place in their survival 
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unit. They usually provide a sense of belonging in combination with a certain 
protection against loss of material security and physical safety. They tend to 
become a taken-for-granted part of the group’s culture – of its members’ social 
habitus. 
Notwithstanding counter movements such as the disintegration of the Ro-
man Empire into the Dark Ages, processes of differentiation, integration, and 
functional democratisation have been dominant over the whole of human histo-
ry, and with renewed strength and clarity from the 16th century onwards.10 In 
Europe and the Middle East, they continued in more or less the same direction, 
taking the course of state formation processes in which “private” leaders of 
survival units such as war lords and knights became courtiers. From the courts, 
the “private” royal functions of managing the monopolies over the use of vio-
lence and taxation were gradually, or by revolution, transformed into the bu-
reaucratic public functions of state institutions. It was an institutional democra-
tisation, a transformation from private to public: state monopolies transferred 
into the hands of an increasingly wider public.  
However, from a somewhat wider perspective it was also a process of func-
tional democratisation, as shown by what happened in states such as Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, or France. Particularly in the 19th century, 
Elias writes, they saw “a strong advance of functional democratisation integrat-
ing practically all classes into the state structure,” and these developments 
“brought a deep-rooted predisposition of the individual personality structures 
of people of all classes to live together in this specific form, as Danes, Dutch or 
French” (Elias 2010, 196).  
 
10  Wilterdink (2017, 29) disagrees: “Since the emergence of agriculture,” he writes, “functional 
differentiation and the growth of networks of interdependence went hand in hand with the 
growth of power differentials within and between human societies – increasing stratifica-
tion, growing distance between elites and common people, sharper differentiation between 
rulers and ruled.” This perspective places too much emphasis on growing inequality, thereby 
idealising previous societies and their simpler organisations as exhibiting greater equality. 
However, when human organisations expanded and gained complexity – which must have 
occurred ever since people learned to organise the control of fire, a long time before “agri-
culture” – they connected more people to each other. All of these people had to take more 
aspects of each other into account more frequently in order to live up to the codes of their 
organised living together – that is, according to the expanding functional differentiation, 
integration, and complexity of fire-regime societies (see Goudsblom 1992). Agrarian-regime 
societies followed, and so on. In that sense, they were becoming more “equal” and their 
steering codes came to avoid extreme behaviours more often – a diminishing of contrasts. 
These growing “equalities” coincided with the growing “inequalities” via social stratification 
and power differentials, and both trends have remained co-dominant (Wouters 2019a). Also, 
“more power differentiations” cannot simply be equated with “more inequality” for it usual-
ly means “more equality” in some respects and “more inequality” in others. The co-dominant 
trend of rising equalities gained ascendance over the trend of rising inequalities in the sec-
ond part of the 19th century, which coincided with the process of informalisation. 
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Processes of functional democratisation have continued and permeated vari-
ous parts and layers of people in various ways and degrees. Eventually, on the 
whole and in the long run, some of this functional democratisation has perme-
ated every detail of the interdependency networks in question. In that sense, it 
was an all-pervasive process. 
At present, so many processes of integration and disintegration are taking 
place simultaneously that observers often find themselves equipped with little 
means to appreciate which of them are more or less significant than others. On 
closer inspection, I think it is plausible that differentiation and integration pro-
cesses within Western nation states and their national economies have been 
dominant and have increasingly achieved broader, more encompassing levels. 
However, in the course of reaching an international and then global level, dif-
ferentiation and integration have simultaneously triggered integration conflicts 
and disintegration. Stark examples are World War I and World War II: both 
can be understood as integration conflicts with the disintegration of Europe as 
an initial side-effect, and the integration of Germany within Europe as a side-
effect that took a little longer to realise. From this perspective, these wars ap-
pear as temporary fluctuations in the long-term development of social differen-
tiation and integration, with functional democratisation as their long-term 
“side-effect.” 
Adding a few simpler examples will probably help illustrate this balance be-
tween integration and disintegration. The first is from a late phase in Western 
national integration processes in which the welfare state and its institutions 
emerged and spread national incomes more equally among its citizens. The 
result was a significant decline in the fear of poverty and the spread of an 
“equanimity of the welfare state” (van Stolk and Wouters 1987; Wouters 2007, 
214, 223). Welfare state organisations enabled women and young people to feel 
and act more independently of their husbands and fathers – a clear example of 
functional democratisation: on the level of the state, all citizens became more 
interdependent and, at the same time, many became less subordinate to their 
former (male) superiors. On the other hand, as the authority of the latter dimin-
ished, the volume of voices bemoaning and complaining about this loss in-
creased, claiming the disintegration of traditional family life and the destruc-
tion of familial ties. 
Over the past several decades, examples of integration processes that trigger 
integration conflicts and part-processes of disintegration are related increasing-
ly to what David Riesman et al. (1950) would have conceptualised as transi-
tions from tradition and inner-directed cultures and personalities to other-
directed ones. Such transitions can also be understood in terms of integration 
conflicts and tensions between people living in cultures and countries where 
the phase of formalising manners and emotion regulation is still dominant, as 
opposed to those in countries where informalisation has spread. An example of 
this (also described in Wouters 2007, 206-8) is the national campaign launched 
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in 1995 by the Vietnamese authorities against what were called “negative for-
eign influences.” “American cultural imperialism” in particular was considered 
a serious threat to “traditional morals.” In the 1920s and 1930s, many European 
authorities used similar language. A Dutch government committee, for in-
stance, warned against the “demoralising Americanisation of Europe.” The 
threat was disparagingly referred to as “instinctual life” with “primitive feel-
ings.” Both the Dutch authorities in the inter-war years and the Vietnamese 
authorities in the 1990s took disciplinary measures to prevent the population 
becoming “estranged” or “alienated” from tradition and forming a treacherous 
union with “strangers” or “aliens” and their more informalised lifestyle. These 
examples of high-handed attempts at defending “traditional morals” can be 
extended globally by pointing to groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and 
Islamic State which feed on the same cause (see Dunning 2019). The social 
costs of these integration conflicts are clearly vast. 
Another example of integration processes that trigger integration conflicts 
involves the merger waves that have swept through most western countries 
since the 1960s and 1970s (Wouters 1990a). Whether on the level of towns and 
cities, schools and universities, or business firms and corporations, the same 
story can be told again and again from the perspective of integration and func-
tional democratisation, as well as from the perspective of disintegration or 
defunctionalisation. When I explained these two perspectives to a friend, a 
personnel manager who had witnessed a tidal wave of mergers between acad-
emies, colleges, and schools, he could easily provide examples of how, in the 
process of merging, independent schools and colleges lost cohesion and soli-
darity. “In the transition, the life and soul of these organisations was often 
severely damaged,” he said, “and you could sense it all over the place, in the 
teachers, the students, and in their relationships.” Most of them were mourning 
the loss of their old we-identity, and they rejected the possibility of identifying 
with the higher-level organisation as a sort of “treason.” As a side effect of 
integration, part-processes of disintegration can unintentionally damage or 
break social functions that people have performed for each other in a preceding 
phase of development. Such a loss of function can be experienced by them as 
the extinguishing of a significant source of what gave meaning to their jobs and 
their lives. 
As the expanding networks of interdependence reach the periphery of the 
world, many citizens in the European Union also feel a loss of their old we-
identity at the level of nation-states. They feel they have lost much of their 
former national independence and international status, which hurts their nation-
al pride; they seem to be in a state of mourning, anger, or both. They are hesi-
tant or even feel repugnance towards identifying with higher organisational 
levels than the nation-state, and they would rather cling to their national territo-
rial borders and symbols. These feelings and longings are acknowledged by 
most political parties, and especially populist ones. As long as the we-
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identification of people in these states remains predominantly on the level of 
their nation-states and continues to hamper the shift to higher organisational 
levels such as the European Union, this limited orientation and identification 
will continue to limit and diminish the power chances of all national political 
parties and governments, particularly when compared with the growing power 
chances of social organisations governing the world of finance and global 
corporations. Even when populists win, take over the government, and decide 
to leave higher-level organisations such as the European Union, they may in-
crease their power chances nationally but decrease and hamper their spread 
internationally. 
From the 1980s onward, as capital, commerce, and whole industries moved 
from Western countries to cheap-labour countries, this global trend was ac-
companied with defunctionalisation, integration conflicts, and disintegration, 
not only in countries with cheap labour, but also in those where labour is rela-
tively expensive. In the West, research for the McKinsey Global Institute11 
reported that between 2005 and 2014, real incomes in 25 advanced economies 
“were flat, or fell, for 65-70 percent of households [in USA 81%], or more than 
540 million people. The most seriously affected are young, less-educated 
workers, raising the real risk of a generation growing up poorer than their par-
ents.” Particularly since the 2008/2009 crisis, a decline of optimism, spurred by 
declining and/or stagnant wages, was mirrored by a rise of optimism in the 
East. In 2017, IPSOS global research reported an “optimism divide” between 
East and West.12 The mirror-image can also apply to the world of technology 
and beyond – US market capitalism mirrors Chinese state capitalism. Although 
“state surveillance” and “market surveillance” are backed up by very different 
ideologies, both systems do not differ much in their totalitarian approach, while 
their big tech companies are becoming increasingly entwined on global mar-
kets, where ideological differences increasingly become secondary (van Dijck 
2019, 24). 
As a rule, defunctionalisation in rich countries attracts more attention in the 
West than when it happens far away from it. These are common manifestations 
of an identification with the established we-groups of the West as a kind of 
global upper class. Eurocentric or occidental manifestations of such an identifi-
cation are commonly formed and expressed in defence against expanding 
and/or rising groups of local and/or global outsiders. Among the established, 
the feeling of being threatened by outsiders often triggers them to close their 
ranks, thereby trying to reinforce their position as part of a globally established 
upper-class of rich countries and rich people.  
This defence mechanism of the established often functions unwittingly, as it 
does in many forms of populism. It also functions unwittingly in dealing with 
 
11 <http://www.mckinsey.com>.  
12 <http://www.ipsosglobaltrends.com>.  
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subjects such as global warming and climate change: many people are unaware 
of their Occidentalism as they congratulate themselves on advances towards 
decreasing their ecological “footprint” on the world, fully oblivious to the 
ecological costs of both outsourcing the production of goods to the other side 
of the world and of transporting finished products back to the West. From a 
global perspective, this “hidden impact” means that if the “external effects” or 
the global ecological costs of their lives and their lifestyle are included, West-
erners are still increasing their “ecological footprint” across the world. In her 
book, Hidden Impact, Babette Porcelijn presents the example of “hidden ener-
gy”: 
Rich Western countries have transferred many of their production facilities to 
low-wage countries such as China and India. The plants used in these coun-
tries use lots of energy to make stuff for our markets. Energy in the supply 
chain is not included in energy labels nor on your energy bill. This energy is 
invisible to us, the energy is hidden from our view. We import these things 
and therefore we finance hidden energy without knowing it. So, part of the na-
tional energy consumption in production countries should be on the tab of 
wealthy countries. (Porcelijn 2016, 34)  
This hidden impact can only be revealed from a global perspective that exposes 
what remains hidden from established Western perspectives. The analogy with 
functional democratisation and disintegration is clear: only from a more de-
tached view of the on-going global intertwining of social functions does it 
become possible to see the extent to which interdependency chains expanding 
on a global level coincide with rising social inequalities, defunctionalisation, 
and integration conflicts in the West, while in other places they coincide with 
some disruptive integration conflicts and with functional democratisation. 
From this broader perspective, it seems possible and probable that continued 
global intertwining is connected with centrifugal (disintegrative) tendencies in 
some places as well as centripetal (integrative) trends in others. Therefore, 
looking at the world as a whole, an overall global trend of functional democra-
tisation remains dominant. Hence, it is important to understand the long-term 
trend of functional democratisation – and whether it has lost or gained domi-
nance – from the larger framework of rising levels of differentiation, integra-
tion, and increasing complexity, and to study the extent to which these process-
es have functional democratisation as well as disintegration and integration 
conflicts as their side effects. 
Research into questions around which trend is dominant – or whether pro-
cesses of differentiation, integration, and functional democratisation have 
stalled, cease altogether, or even change direction – needs to focus on both 
equalising and/or de-equalising side effects. Looking at “big history” and hu-
man history as a whole, the life processes of differentiation (competition), 
integration (co-operation), and increasing complexity (synthesis) have re-
mained dominant as process drivers. And as differentiation and integration 
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processes became dominant on a global level, the processes of functional de-
mocratisation also continued on that level. 
5. Decolonisation as an Example of Functional 
Democratisation 
A significant moment in the expanding global network of interdependencies 
emerged when both competition through the accumulation of land and colonial-
ism either diminished or came to an end. Decolonisation signalled the decline 
of the West as a globally established upper-class of rich countries, and in the 
eyes of many of its rich people their world was falling apart, but the disintegra-
tion that decolonisation entailed was a counter-current within a spurt of global 
integration and functional democratisation. To varying degrees, decolonisation 
also spread to the countries behind the iron curtain with the collapse of the 
USSR. Politically autonomous nation-states then became the globally accepted 
dominant standard of social organisation, a rule proven by the exception of the 
“failed state,” a concept that refers to a place where the state does not function 
“normally” and where individuals and groups suffer reductions or even total 
loss of function and power potential. 
To a large extent, decolonisation can be understood in terms of functional 
democratisation. Within political and economic interdependency networks, 
functional differentiation had proceeded to a point where the desire for political 
democratisation could find political expression. After World War II, European 
colonial empires were exhausted and anti-colonial superpowers were compet-
ing for support in former colonies. The expansion of global networks reached a 
critical density, implying a functional democratisation that forced up the price 
of violence as well as the value of human life. In the post-colonial era, it be-
came less likely simply to settle conflicts between nation-states by violent 
means such as dispatching armies or gun-boats. Bombing from planes and 
drones is still considered and practiced by those who think that bombing can 
win the battle, for example in wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Syria. These wars, particularly the first two, centred around the ideological 
fears and dreams attached to the communist and capitalist power blocks. They 
were symptomatic of the global shift from a colonial competition for land to-
wards an ideological competition for the best social organisation to provide a 
“good life” in terms of freedom, equality, and welfare. From the collapse of the 
USSR and the rise of a capitalist communism in China, the ideologies of the 
main power blocks lost much of their significance and distinctiveness, thus 
unveiling the bare competition for power with greater clarity. Global competi-
tion was increasingly revealed as a competition for commercial, industrial, and 
financial power – so much so that the conclusion of a widening gap between 
rich and poor states in the world is based on the criterion of income only. If that 
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comparison were also based on the balance of power and human dignity, then 
the fact that colonialism came to an end between the 1940s and the 1980s 
would entail the conclusion that the gap between rich and poor nations has also 
diminished. From this perspective, the decline of this gap can be seen as a 
continuation of the 19th-century development that brought a formal end to 
slavery, and both as parts of “the overall trend” of functional democratisation 
that was “to reduce all power potentials between different groups, even down 
to those between men and women, parents and children” (2012b [1970], 63). It 
implies that the process of “functional democratisation” extends at least some 
of its explanatory significance to the history of the emancipation of women, 
young people, and children from under the wings of husbands, adults, and 
parents. 
In the last decades of the 20th century, the spread and intensification of re-
straints on international military intervention generated favourable conditions 
for internationally operating commercial and financial enterprises. A similar 
pacification process had occurred in an earlier era when territories were paci-
fied internally and thus became nation-states. It was one of the major favoura-
ble conditions for commerce, industry, and finance to prosper on a national 
scale. Now, over extended pacified territories, the competitive struggle for the 
accumulation of money continued and intensified on a global scale. It is the 
global extension of the process in which the balance of power in court societies 
increasingly shifted from the aristocracy in favour of the functional and com-
mercial bourgeoisie. In the post-colonial era, this shift extended from nation-
states to the world at large, providing higher levels of physical safety as well as 
material security to an increasingly wider public. Simultaneously, violence 
receded to some extent as a means of settling conflicts on a national, interna-
tional, and global scale, while the means of money advanced. This also means 
that those who provide physical safety functions have lost some of their former 
power and glory in the world of rich, materialistic, and relatively pacified coun-
tries in which virtually all eyes are focused on money and its discontents. 
6.  Growing Interdependence Triggers an Ambivalence 
that Reduces Power Potentials between Groups: 
Functional Democratisation 
In his book on the process of civilisation, Elias claims that as networks of so-
cial interdependence expand and their links multiply and increase in density, “a 
specific duality or even multiplicity of interests manifests itself more strongly” 
in the relations between individuals as well as between different functional 
strata. In this argument, Elias describes the open or latent ambivalence that is 
crucial for understanding and explaining functional democratisation: 
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As social functions and interests become increasingly complex and contradic-
tory, we find more and more frequently in the behaviour and feelings of peo-
ple a peculiar split, a co-existence of positive and negative elements, a mixture 
of muted affection and muted dislike in varying proportions and nuances. The 
possibilities of pure, unambiguous enmity grow fewer; and, more and more 
perceptibly, every action taken against an opponent also threatens the social 
existence of its perpetrator – it disturbs the whole mechanism of chains of ac-
tion of which each is a part. (2012a, 352–3) 
At this point, Elias presents an example that is interesting also because he 
writes this in the mid-1930s, when Hitler and the Nazis were in power and he 
himself was in exile. After stating that “with the growing division of functions, 
the relations between different power units become increasingly ambivalent,” 
he continues: 
The relations between states in our own time, above all in Europe, offer a 
clear example of this. Even if integration and the division of functions be-
tween them have not yet advanced as far as the division of functions within 
them, every military exchange nevertheless so threatens this highly differenti-
ated network of nations as a whole that in the end the victor finds himself in a 
seriously shaken position. He is no longer able – or willing – to depopulate 
and devastate the enemy country sufficiently to settle a part of his own popu-
lation in it. He must, in the interest of victory, destroy as far as possible the 
industrial power of the enemy, and at the same time, in the interest of his own 
peace, try within limits to preserve or restore his industrial apparatus. (ibid., 
353) 
Elias goes on to sketch the potential winnings of such a war – “colonial posses-
sions, frontier revisions, export markets, economic, or military advantages” – 
and then drives home his point that  
because in the struggles of highly complex societies, each rival and opponent 
[each nation-state] is at the same time a partner on the production line of the 
same machinery, every sudden and radical change in one sector of this net-
work [of states] inevitably leads to a disruption and changes in another […]. 
The inevitable conflicts grow increasingly risky for the whole precarious sys-
tem of nations. However, through these very tensions and discharges the fig-
uration moves slowly towards a more unequivocal form of hegemony, and 
towards an integration, perhaps at first of a federative kind, of larger units 
around specific hegemonic centres. (ibid., 353)  
At this point, Elias continues his account by drawing social classes into the 
picture, arguing that 
the relationship between different social classes within a dominion becomes, 
with the advancing division of functions, more and more ambivalent in the 
same way. Here, too, within a far more restricted space, groups whose social 
existence is mutually dependent through the division of functions are strug-
gling for certain opportunities. They too are at one and the same time oppo-
nents and partners. There are extreme situations in which the existing organi-
sation of a society functions so badly, and the tensions within it grow so large, 
that a large portion of the people and classes within it ‘no longer care’ […]. 
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Up to this revolutionary situation, the classes bound together by the division 
of functions are cast back and forth between their split and contradictory in-
terests. […] the hour of the strong central authority within a highly differenti-
ated society strikes when the ambivalence of interests of the most important 
functional groups grows so large, and power is distributed so evenly between 
them, that there can be neither a decisive compromise nor a decisive conflict 
between them. It is a figuration of this kind to which the term ‘royal mecha-
nism’ is applied here. (ibid., 353-55, italics in original) 
People with functions in the world of politics – producing physical safety – and 
those with functions in the field of commerce and money – producing material 
security – are also opponents and partners at the same time. Particularly in the 
19th century, the balance of power between them was clearly in favour of those 
representing the rising power of nation-states. They also offered chances and 
set limits to those representing the world of money. Status competition in and 
between increasingly complex societies and inherent tensions and discharges 
have moved all involved to further integration and intensification of being 
partners and opponents at the same time… until the people in the world of 
commerce exceeded their actions and power beyond national boundaries to a 
degree that tilted the balance of power more and more in their favour. At pre-
sent, after four decades of this “globalisation,” there is an ongoing crisis in the 
world of politics. But this is not a “revolutionary situation” and the world 
seems far removed from the “hour of the strong central authority,” so the con-
tours of a global “royal mechanism” remain vague. 
Moreover, for many people in the West, these words will also have echoes 
of the past, for in the field of politics and as citizens of states, relations of pow-
er, and dependency between them are now distributed so evenly while becom-
ing so complicated and dense that they take it for granted that neither a decisive 
compromise nor a decisive conflict between them are viable options. They live 
with levels of interdependency in which virtually all involved have learned to 
assess and negotiate their own and each other’s ability to live and operate as 
opponents and partners simultaneously. To a large extent this has become a 
normal tension-balance in their lives. Thus, this balance functions largely un-
knowingly as an important driving force behind the further development of 
their sensitivity and ability that is increasingly required in their ongoing status 
competition (Wouters 1992, 2011b, 2014).  
In the West, therefore, the revolutionary option as a viable solution has prac-
tically disappeared. Revolutions and other decisive ways of escaping the am-
bivalence that comes with relatively equal power relations are reminiscent of 
the rather rigid status-ridden social relations between people who share a strong 
fear of slippery slopes and other characteristics of a second-nature type person-
ality structure (Wouters 2012). More and more people now live in much closer 
social and psychic proximity to each other (for evidence, see Wouters 2007, 
chapter 4). From childhood on, they develop higher levels of mutually expected 
self-restraints and learn to be less rigid, less ruled by fears of slippery slopes, 
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and to be more open to their ambivalences, while at the same time releasing 
many inherent social and psychic tensions by playing with them in sensitive 
and flexible ways, thus strengthening the trend towards informalisation. In the 
era of informalisation, relational codes of mutual respect and equality have 
spread, while the relatively recent threats of global warming and mutually 
assured destruction (MAD) have added to these pressures, facilitating an identi-
fication with humanity as an undivided whole. 
7.  On Processes of Social Differentiation and Integration: 
The Force of the Competition and Interweaving 
Mechanism 
In Elias’s perspective on international relations and on the pervasive force of 
constraints at higher levels of differentiation, integration, and complexity, the 
division of social functions proceeds on the “production line” of “machinery” 
driven by the unremitting “mechanism of competition and monopoly” (Elias 
2012a, 353). This may sound rather mechanistic and too absolute, since a mo-
nopoly is not decisive in enabling this movement, but what is decisive is a 
growing density and an expanding range of interdependency networks through 
the interweaving of human functions and activities. Therefore, I came to the 
conclusion (in Wouters 1990) that this mechanism is more adequately concep-
tualised as “competition and interweaving” because “competition” can be un-
derstood as the major driving force of differentiation, while “interweaving” can 
stand for integration. Thus, the processes of “competition and interweaving” 
are connected conceptually with those of “differentiation and integration.” 
In the commercial world as well as in the field of politics, competition (dif-
ferentiation) and interweaving (integration) have been and continue to be major 
processes. Early on in the era of industrialisation, by the success and expansion 
of their businesses, private owners of enterprises were required to delegate to 
others more and more of the functions that originally, according to Fritz 
Croner’s “delegation theory,” were performed by owners themselves (1962, 
132-3). This specific kind of division or differentiation of functions resulted 
from the expanding size of enterprises, from their bifurcations, and from the 
increasing complexity of the economy – they were major process drivers of 
capitalism. And not only of capitalism, but also of the “nationalisation” of 
states, a process that “went hand with the growing power of the bourgeoisie, 
particularly as their language came to be transformed into the national language 
of France, Italy, or Germany,” as Kuzmics et al. argue (2020, 15). Another 
major symptom and process driver of both capitalism and nationalisation can 
be found in the expanding stock market. “In 1850, three-quarters of the funds 
listed on the London stock exchange market were government bonds. The same 
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applied in Paris and Amsterdam. Stock exchanges were as yet of little signifi-
cance to private companies” (Heilbron 2005, 8). The processes of competition 
and interweaving (differentiation and integration) continued, particularly in the 
long wave of globalisation from the 1870s to 1914, and again after World War 
I until the Great Depression. After World War II, this trend continued until 
more and more private ownership in the rich West was transformed into shared 
ownership via saleable shares on stock markets, thus creating a widening gap 
between owners or investors and entrepreneurs, comprising an increasingly 
wide variety of managers and CEOs. 
Also in the world of politics and diplomacy, the present trend of competition 
and interweaving towards an increasingly global system of interdependent 
nation-states seems undisputed. In the words of Johan Goudsblom,  
No one who is not bewildered by short-term fluctuations can fail to recognize 
this trend leading to ever more extensive social formations, controlled by ever 
more encompassing centres monopolizing the means of organized violence. 
That these growing monopolies are not immediately stable goes without say-
ing. (1983)13  
If we take the longer-term view of many centuries, from this perspective even 
major violent conflicts such as World War I and World War II become “tempo-
rary fluctuations” in the long-term development of nation-states and their re-
gimes of manners and emotion regulation.  
This view is also in keeping with the results of my study of changes in these 
regimes in four western countries since the 1880s. I concluded that “World 
War II functioned predominantly as a catalyst. Arguably, in terms of changes in 
the codes of manners and emotion regulation over the twentieth century, both 
major wars and their aftermath seem to have had little effect on the overall 
trend” (Wouters 2007, 173). I remember using the words “little effect” and 
“little independent lasting effect” hesitantly and reluctantly because of the 
obvious and lasting effect of Nazi brutalities on their victims, survivors, and 
their descendants. This realisation made it difficult to acknowledge that the 
atrocities of two big wars of the 20th century had “small significance for over-
all developments in regimes of manners and emotions.” 
To do justice to the horrors of violent periods such as the two World Wars is 
only possible, of course, by zooming in on the atrocities. Looking at the signif-
icance of these periods within long-term processes, however, demands a rela-
tively high level of detachment, which may arise from zooming in and out, by 
studying events alternately from a smaller and a greater distance. In this way, 
their place can be seen from a short-term perspective as well as from a long-
term perspective, including a view on the moment when time stood still in 
 
13  <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1983/06/16/elias-defended/>.  
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horror as well as on the partial and passing moment of decivilisation. As long 
as the first view dominates and the second remains painful, mourning and/or 
shame will prevail, in which case the long-term perspective may lose so much 
validity and meaning that it meets with moral indignation. Any attempt to 
perceive and do justice to both presents a serious problem to the balance of 
involvement and detachment because it could trigger sometimes incompatible 
identifications and strongly conflicting emotions. Yet, the act of zooming in 
and out involves a central function for all human emotion regulation as well as 
a central task for all social science: to maintain a tenaciously high degree of 
identification with both the established and the outsiders, as we-groups and 
they-groups, on all levels and moments in the history of our lives, and in the 
context of humanity amid all other life on earth. 
We do not have to zoom out far to see that we still live in the post-
colonialist period, just past the early stages of the “Anti-Colonial Revolution.” 
Particularly after the end of the Cold War, this became increasingly apparent: 
processes of competition and interweaving had entangled nearly every state in 
global interdependency networks. In some parts of the world, former colonial-
ists had become the established powers in large states such as the USA, Cana-
da, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, and New Zealand, states that now more or less 
counted as belonging to the West, while the original inhabitants of these estab-
lished colonialist-states were marginalised as outsiders on their land.14 Repre-
sentations of formerly colonised peoples by the former colonisers followed the 
pattern of established-outsider relations according to which the identity of the 
outsiders in the view of the established is usually modelled after its minority of 
the worst and the identity of the established is modelled after its minority of the 
best. In processes of decolonisation, romanticised as well as demonised repre-
sentations of both colonised and colonising people were attacked, for example 
by Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (1961) and Edward Saïd’s Orien-
talism (1978). The pressure of attacks resulted in a differentiation of represen-
tations in the direction of “decreasing contrasts, increasing varieties,” but they 
did not disappear – far from it, as the balance of power between the formerly 
colonised and colonising peoples is still very unequal. 
 
14  The meaning of “land” as in “Always was, always will be Aboriginal land,” a slogan claiming 
sovereignty. 
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8.  On the Shifting Balance of Power Between Politicians 
(Physical Safety) and Business People (Material 
Security) 
The ongoing competition and cooperation between and among states and indus-
tries have exerted pressures in the direction of increasing global interdependen-
cies, generating two questions. 
The first question is comparative, and it stems from earlier processes of state 
formation in which the earlier “private” control over the state’s provision of 
physical safety via the monopolies of taxation and the use of violence came 
into the hands of an increasingly wider public: Have competition and inter-
weaving processes in the world of money developed to an extent where their 
function of providing material security are also shifting from private to public? 
The second question: Have social functions in the world of finance and 
commerce expanded with greater force and rapidity in the last half a century 
compared to the world of politics and diplomacy? (Kapteyn 1996; Blomert 
2012). 
As businesses grew during industrialisation, private ownership was increas-
ingly transformed into shared ownership: issuing shares was another step to-
wards the shift from a private to a more public operation of many social organi-
sations providing material security. A further move in this direction took place 
in many European states in which national income was shared via taxation and 
the reallocating principles of welfare state institutions. In the formation of 
welfare states, the provision of physical safety and material security to some 
extent intermingled and contributed to the expansion of both the world of poli-
ticians and government and the world of business people and finance. It was a 
period of economic growth in which the “powers” of the world of commerce, 
industry, and finance as well as those in the field of politics were rising. Then, 
the two largely evened each other out because the power balance arena was still 
largely restricted by national boundaries and also because of negotiated agree-
ments between political parties and workers unions through which govern-
ments could use “the right to work” to pressurise entrepreneurs and their indus-
tries (Blomert 2012). Until the 1970s, the balance of power arena hardly 
exceeded the magnitude of single nation-states.15 And most of the richer states 
 
15  This can be confirmed by an example taken from my thesis of 1971, in which I observed a 
trend towards monopolisation on the basis of increasing numbers of “giant multi-national 
businesses.” I added that the economy page of a Dutch national newspaper, De Volkskrant 
(Amsterdam), mentions an estimated 500 of these giants exist. In 2016, about 60,000 trans-
national corporations with about 500,000 branches were spread across the world (Kordos 
and Vojtovic 2016, 152). 
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still had a complex established regime to regulate commerce, industry, and 
capital.  
During the 1980s, many of these regulations were softened and/or changed 
in favour of the “free market.” In 1983, an administrator of the World Bank 
commented, “The new gods are the free market and private enterprise; the new 
devils are governments and planning agencies.”16 The 1980s saw power ratios 
shift from a favourable climate for national politicians in the direction of a 
more favourable national and international commercial climate, along with the 
neo-liberal politics of competitive deregulation. As the growth of trade and 
industry coincided with a deregulation of capital markets, increasing numbers 
of people were subjected to its “iron laws” in a wave of company takeovers in 
the USA starting in the 1970s. Increasing international waves of mergers and 
takeovers signalled a newly prosperous global and globally organised world of 
money which penetrated, and to some extent came to dominate, the political 
world, both on a national and a global level. 
Merger waves and other integration processes were rapidly increasing to in-
ternational and global levels, for example, by global enterprises transferring 
labour-intensive production to countries where labour was cheap and plentiful. 
In these low-income and low-wage countries, the transfer was welcomed for 
the opportunities it brought, providing work and raising income, but it also 
placed these countries in competition with each other. Similar processes oc-
curred on a global scale, as governments in poor countries came under rising 
competitive pressures to enforce the kind of policies that would attract compa-
nies and capital investors (Wouters 2007, Appendix 1). Since the 1990s, rela-
tively poor nation-states in eastern EU countries came to function as low-cost 
labour centres, and in the process their governments were increasingly drawn 
into a competition for western European capital and investments, resulting in 
spirals of decreasing taxes on the profits of multinational corporations and 
increasing restrictions on labour unions. These spirals widened to increasingly 
include more and also more affluent countries in the West. The importation of 
“market civilisation” (Gills 1995; Linklater 2012) was part and parcel of “the 
disciplinary force of the market” (Haskell 1985, 561).  
Since then, predominantly from a global perspective, the field of politics ap-
parently lags further and further behind the world of money, particularly with 
regard to integrating their social functions to higher levels. This can be under-
stood from the fact that politicians, particularly in complex democracies, are 
always highly dependent upon their constituents and the people running a large 
number of highly complex democratic institutions, and they will have to please 
them in order to be (re)elected and remain in power. In comparison, the people 
running commercial, industrial, and financial businesses are far less restricted 
 
16  Prof. I. van Dam in NRC Handelsblad, July 1, 1983, also quoted in Wouters 1986. 
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in how they run their companies, and to some extent they are able to escape 
geographical limits to their activities by moving their money and their compa-
nies to more profitable places in the world.  
Politicians are unable to do this, of course – they cannot serve their constitu-
encies from abroad, and in addition, they are bound to their country for reasons 
of “state security.” The rise and spread of public welfare-state institutions may 
have appeared to many as the completion of national differentiation and inte-
gration, but functional differentiation remained firmly restricted to the internal 
affairs of nation-states. Their inter-relationships – their “foreign policy” or 
“external affairs” – were held in the hands of an oligarchy of national politi-
cians, if only “for reasons of state security” (cf. Elias 2010, 205-6). This is 
another reason why the integration of the field of politics increasingly lags 
behind that in the world of money, and why the taken-for-granted framework 
and point of departure for politicians in discussing topics related to processes of 
differentiation, integration, and democratisation have continued to be the na-
tion-state or groups comprising them.  
“State security” was also a way in which powerful countries such as the 
USA and the UK ensured their national power politics would prevail over 
international rights by ignoring the United Nations and breaking agreements 
made within this global institution by going to war in Iraq – a demonstration of 
might-is-right in a display of “shock and awe.” Their policy backfired because 
no weapons of mass destruction were found, and therefore “state security” was 
not an issue, but it also backfired because, by violating and breaking the sym-
bolic unity of the UN, they significantly lowered its power and status. The war 
diminished the chance of enlarging the power of this global organisation of 
politicians, and it also hampered the development and rise of an oligarchy of 
international politicians that could advance additional global regulations in-
tended to prevent violations of “state security.” In addition, it reduced the 
chances of developing a policy that would set limits and rules to the power of 
the global oligarchy of commercial and financial “aristocrats,” or “moneyc-
rats.” When the USA and the UK pushed the UN aside and invaded Iraq, they 
also affected the balance of power between the world of politics and the world 
of money in favour of the latter: in absence of a strong global political organi-
sation and a corresponding global political oligarchy, the finance oligarchs 
could play the oligarchies of national politicians more easily against one anoth-
er.17  
 
17  In 2009, when official US troops were withdrawn from Iraq, the US government allowed 
commercial organisations such as defence contractors and private military companies to 
move into the created power vacuum for to provide “security.” A somewhat similar process 
on a national scale had occurred when the success of the US government in its war against 
the Mafia and its “protection rackets” created many a power vacuum that were left for 
commercial companies to fill.” Both cases illustrate and demonstrate how, in comparison to 
most European states, the US state monopoly of violence is lagging behind. 
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The World Trade Organisation (WTO) came to a similar position of decline. 
Early in 2018, President Trump abused a WTO treaty by appealing to “state 
security” as a legal basis for announcing the imposition of heavy tariffs 
on imports of steel and aluminium to the USA. This neo-mercantilist policy is 
indicative of how Trump runs the USA: as a business corporation and thus he 
undermines the operation of the WTO. Pascal Lamy (former Euro-
commissioner and director-general of WTO) admitted “the necessity of prepar-
ing for plan B: a WTO without the USA” (NRC Handelsblad March 10, 2018). 
George W. Bush and Tony Blair, and later Theresa May, Donald Trump, and 
Boris Johnson (and their supporters) are seeking to address nationalist concerns 
by challenging the dominance of global interdependencies. Meanwhile, Chi-
nese political and commercial oligarchs expand their global presence. 
This exemplifies how people in the fields of money and politics intermingle 
on a global scale. It also shows how the common interests and power sources 
of business people and finance oligarchy around the globe increased to the 
extent that many people came to believe that “what is good for the economy, is 
good for the nation.” National interests were increasingly understood in terms 
of economic interests, particularly in the USA: “It might be an exaggeration to 
say that the American government is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of big 
business – but not much of an exaggeration” (Mennell 2014b), and even less 
since President Trump.  
In the 1980s, managing money was becoming an industry in itself. More and 
more private citizens became investors: “In the 1970s, about 400,000 people 
invested in stocks and shares in the Netherlands; by 2000, just before the de-
cline of the market, the number had risen to almost two million” (Heilbron 
2005, 5). Institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual funds flood-
ed the stock markets and became “the dominant force in the functioning of 
financial markets as well as in the development of large firms” (Heilbron 2005, 
3). This brought about a collectivisation of private stock ownership, it did not 
result so much in “pension fund socialism,” but rather in a rise of shareholder 
power and an “investor capitalism” that is based on ownership, not entrepre-
neurship (Heilbron 2005, 14). Investor capitalism is characterised and driven 
by managerial shareholder activism and hostile takeovers. The short-term mo-
tive of these takeovers – to get as much money as possible out of shares – often 
dominates more long-term entrepreneurial motives. Company managers who 
fail to base their business orientation consistently on shareholders’ interests 
were put under serious pressure: 
[They] saw their share prices fall, increasing their vulnerability to a takeover. 
Dependency on the stock market forced the management to adapt to the new 
balance of power, and many top managers did so by securing better pay and 
protection. Provisions for golden parachutes in the event of dismissal, together 
with share and option plans were soon standard elements of managers’ con-
tracts. With pay dependent on share prices, the interests of top management 
and shareholders coincided far more than before, and increasing shareholder 
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value came to prevail over other company objectives. […] For professional 
investors the important thing is not so much to determine which shares have 
the highest return, but to find out which shares are likely to be most popular 
with other investors. (Heilbron 2005, 16)  
Thus, the popularity contest that is deeply rooted in American culture – and 
explained through America’s relatively open status competition in absence of a 
central good society with good-society functions such as regulating social 
mobility and status competition (see Wouters 2004, 2007, 2011b, 2014)18 – has 
now penetrated further, deep into the stock market and American capitalism.  
While the watchdogs of big-business managers have shifted from the pres-
sures of compromise negotiations with governments and labour unions in the 
1960s and 1970s to the watchdog pressures of shareholders from the 1990s on, 
governments and unions have receded into the background. In recent years, the 
voices of protest against this trend have been rising and even seem to get some 
support from inner circles of American capitalism. In August 2019, The Busi-
ness Roundtable, America’s most powerful lobby group of corporate leaders, 
released a new mission statement on “the purpose of a corporation” that inte-
grated the interests of shareholders with those of stake holders such as workers, 
clients, suppliers, consumers, and society at large. It was a reformulation away 
from the Anglo Saxon Model of “shareholder capitalism” in the direction of the 
Rhineland model of “stakeholder capitalism.” In what they call “conscious 
capitalism,” their interests are no longer “only relevant as a derivative of the 
duty to stockholders.”19 A similar type of change is captured in the spread of 
terms such as “inclusive capitalism” and “sustainable capitalism.”  
 
18  The following quotations will give an impression of the explanatory power of this connec-
tion: “Wide use of exaggeration and superlatives is symptomatic of uncertainty of rank, of 
porous and changing social dividing lines. This characteristic is connected in explanatory 
ways to the process-continuity of the absence of a unified and centralised good society, as 
it still largely functions in the UK. In the USA, a relatively open competition between a large 
variety of centres of power and good societies, and also a stronger reliance upon supervision 
and other forms of external social controls have formed a barrier to the development of 
lower-pitched or subtler forms of expression and negotiation. […] Open competition and its 
related status-striving may also explain why Americans are more directly and more openly 
concerned with social success in terms of popularity. In American etiquette books, manners 
and popularity are closely linked. The manners books from the other countries under study 
use the term ‘success’ or ‘social success’ in the sense of gaining respect and appreciation, 
but the term ‘popularity’ is entirely absent. The close link in American manners books seems 
to be another symptom of relatively high status insecurity and status consciousness” 
(Wouters 2007, 160-1). For how “dating as a way of courting soon became a contest for 
popularity, producing a peculiar mixture of competitive conformity,” see Wouters, Sex, and 
Manners, 2004, here: 94, with advice such as “The intelligent girl does not have to ‘pet’ to 
be popular” (Wallace 1941, 179). See also Willard Waller’s “The rating and dating complex” 
(1937) and Beth Bailey’s From Front Porch to Back Seat (1988). 
19  <https://www.businessroundtable.org/media/all-statements>. 
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“The global market is on a rampage. It needs to be tamed” says Pascal 
Lamy, former member of the European Commission (1999-2004) and Director-
General of the World Trade Organization (2005-2013). And he continues, 
“Who can do that better than Europe? We have a tradition of civilising, we are 
that tradition” (NRC Handelsblad March 25, 2017). Perhaps, and yes, it cer-
tainly is the task of politicians to capitalise upon this bend in the trend and the 
promises it entails, but a more important question is how to proceed from here? 
(For an account of the “standard of civilisation” in world politics, see Linklater 
2016b). 
From a global perspective, both the management of international affairs and 
the increasingly public operation of state institutions appear limited, because 
the differentiation of nation-state functions has stalled and the management of 
international affairs lags behind compared to the management of commercial 
and financial international affairs. There, differentiation and integration pro-
cesses have achieved global dominance, a trend that was accompanied by inte-
gration conflicts and part-processes of disintegration, for example, when possi-
bilities for organising labour unions were curbed before a critical degree of 
their acceptance and their formalisation was established, which resulted in an 
absence or stark reduction of unions and the exploitation of workers (see 
Wouters 2007, 221-5). The financial and economic crisis of 2007-9 is another 
manifestation of this type. At the same time, both examples exemplify the 
tensions and conflicts between the world of politicians and governments on the 
one hand, and the world of commerce, industry, and finance on the other, in 
which representatives of the latter have gained the upper hand. Their advanced 
level of integration has created favourable power chances for elites in the world 
of commerce and finance. These people have not experienced a loss of social 
functions nor a loss of their significance or influence. In fact, the opposite has 
occurred, and they clearly demonstrate this by flexing their muscles and dis-
playing various forms of superiorism20: demanding and allowing each other 
extraordinarily large salaries, buying or bribing politicians, playing poor na-
tion-states against each other, forcing international treaties and legal construc-
tions to curb the power of entire states, evading taxes, and by absolving them-
selves of responsibility for the “externalities” of their activities. Together, these 
activities can be understood as indicating a reversal of democratisation, and a 
shift in the balance of power between the world of politics and the world of 
money in favour of the latter – in this specific sense, it is a de-democratisation 
or movement away from the legitimacy of elected officials. 
 
20  The concept of “superiorism” brings all the ism’s such as racism, sexism, ageism, nationalism, 
ethnocentrism, and so on, onto a higher level of generalisation, highlighting their common 
characteristic: equating power superiority with superiority as a human being (see Wouters 
2007, 219-20). 
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It seems likely that finance oligarchs have been able to get away with their 
excesses for such a long time because so many people have continued and still 
continue to identify with their success. They did so during the long period after 
decolonisation and pacification had turned large parts of the world into areas fit 
for economic enterprise: from the end of the 1970s to the crisis of 2008-9, 
which did not seem to change much. Differentiation and integration processes 
in the world of politics, whether national or international, continued to lag 
behind those in the world of finance and commerce.21  
In the West, the damage caused by the crisis was less for those who “identi-
fied with the established,” whether in the world of politics or the world of 
money, compared to those who “identified with outsiders” (which was so 
prominent in the 1960s and 1970s). In prevailing manners and attitudes towards 
the lower classes and other groups of “outsiders” there was a shift in the carrot-
and-stick balance towards more “stick” and less “carrot.” Marginalised groups 
were treated with less consideration and respect, and with stricter social con-
trol. Outsider groups such as children in residential care, for example, were met 
with “subsequent increases in formal social controls, punitive measures and 
populist support for further restraints,” which was “indicative of fears of a 
potential surge of new criminals, and crime being committed by the demarcated 
outsiders” (Vertigans 2015).22 
In the near future, only small changes can be expected in the balance of 
power between established groups and outsider-groups (Elias and Scotson 
2008), whether local, national, or global, and in business or in politics. An 
example of such a small change at the national level is drawn from the Nether-
lands, where a law was passed in 2013 to cap the salaries of senior people 
working in government services and semi-public organisations that are fi-
nanced or subsidised by taxpayers. Since then, these salaries were prohibited 
by law to exceed the salary of a government minister. The motive behind the 
implementation of this law involved a scandal surrounding a large number of 
people in semi-public organisations earning more than the Prime Minister of 
the country. This clearly demonstrates how the standards from the world of 
commerce had deeply infiltrated and amalgamated with the world of politics. In 
less than 40 years since 1980, people in the world of politics and public ser-
vices had appropriated some standards of the business world and lost some of 
the old-established pride of public servants, who would not even think of 
“stealing” tax-payers’ money by negotiating a salary well above their political 
“masters.” In the process they have created a considerable income disparity 
 
21  The Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP), a treaty between the USA and the EU in the 
tradition of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT; 1946) and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO; 1995), was criticised for promoting the interests of big corporations at 
the expense of EU democracies. Trump had other objections and the treaty is now shelved. 
22  <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.11217607.0004.104>. 
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between themselves and both politicians and the majority of civil servants 
whose terms and conditions have gradually been weakened.23 The law limiting 
top salaries in the world of politics aimed to disentangle both standards. In 
March 2018, a bonus that increased a Dutch bank manager’s salary by 50 per-
cent to over € 3 million was cancelled after loud public outcry: he got € 2 mil-
lion instead.  
Examples like these illustrate how people in business and finance were de-
veloping superiority feelings towards politicians and their voters. Under the 
pressure of this status competition, the money “superiors” were driven to be-
come more unscrupulous and to grab what they can, while increasing numbers 
of politicians came to think they can rise to the same level of superiority by 
“stealing” tax-payers’ money. Alarmed by the weakening ability of state politi-
cians to curb TransNational Corporations (TNCs) excesses and by their inabil-
ity to enlarge their grip on the control of global warming, civil groups and 
social movements have begun to organise international protests such as strikes 
and product boycotts. On a global scale, further public awareness was raised by 
subsequent financial crises such as the Debt crisis, the Mexican pesos crisis 
and the economic crisis of 2007-9, and by public scandals about tax evasion 
and money laundering such as the Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers. 
Crises and scandals formed the impetus for the development of the G7 into the 
G20, and of the FSF (Financial Stability Forum) into the FSB (Financial Stabil-
ity Board; see Kirton 2016), while money-laundering operations such as “Troi-
ka Laundromat,” involving Danske Bank, have pressured the European Bank-
ing Authority (EBA) and the FSB to promote further reform of international 
financial regulations. These and similar developments may gradually add up 
and become part of a more encompassing trend in the direction of greater pub-
lic control over the private governance of capital via national laws and interna-
tional regulations. 
In many European nation-states, the privatisation of police tasks and ser-
vices to ensure physical safety and property protection is a trend in a different 
yet related world, one that moves in a similar direction: under state supervision, 
protection is provided by (sometimes armed) personnel hired for a price. A 
large industry of security guards, security services, or protective services has 
been spreading since the 1980s, together with alarm systems and camera pro-
tection. With the spread of festivals, carnivals, pop concerts, football matches, 
and similar large events, the usual police protection and crowd-control came to 
be replaced or supplemented by private professionals, hired from private organ-
isations – a trend in a direction that could be called “para-militarisation.”  
The USA has private standing “armies” working in their service, usually 
abroad, and here, because the monopolisation of the use of violence by the state 
 
23  The business world probably served as a model because there, an income disparity between 
senior business executives and the workforce was growing in a similar manner. 
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has traditionally been less advanced than in European nation-states, hiring the 
services of armed personnel for guarding property and/or safeguarding people 
has been part of a longstanding tradition. The same goes for other countries 
with relatively lower levels of pacification and a protection industry function-
ing to guard the material and physical wellbeing of those with sufficient finan-
cial means but not enough political influence to warrant protection by the thinly 
spread state forces. In the USA as well as in Latin America and Africa, a lower 
level of pacification can be recognised, for instance, by a relatively large num-
ber of middle-class people living in gated and guarded communities and con-
dominiums.  
In Europe, particularly in its richer nation-states, the protection industry has 
been spreading at national levels, and here, this “para-militarisation” is theoret-
ically and empirically significant not only for its demonstration of rising social 
controls on self-controls but also for a high and taken-for-granted level of paci-
fication. Only where the abstinence from using violence for solving conflicts is 
to a large extent assumed can this regulated deregulation become possible. It is 
an informalisation of previous standards of formalisation, a controlled decon-
trolling of the state’s monopoly of violence.  
Physical safety (from violence) is connected with material security (through 
money) in many ways. In countries where people have developed a high, taken-
for-granted level of pacification, they have also developed a higher sensitivity 
to anything that threatens or is perceived to endanger their established level of 
physical safety and material security. Hence, they become increasingly sensi-
tive to perceptions of risk that require privatised security measures. Except for 
those who can easily afford to buy private security, everyone is now caught in 
this upward spiral of para-militarisation, and they tend to feel increasingly 
threatened in maintaining their level of material security. Thus all the estab-
lished people who (can) keep up with this type of competition become increas-
ingly inclined to de-identify with individual members of outsider groups and to 
practice and support stricter external controls on these “losers.” 
With these words I do not mean to suggest that I take one side or the other, 
the side of physical safety or material security. But they do help to make the 
theoretical and empirical points that a more substantial integration of both 
functions seems likely and that the governance of global issues and conflicts 
increasingly faces pressures toward expanding global governance – the theoret-
ical point being that  
new and higher-level survival-units will rise to the extent that growing inter-
dependence between units at lower levels of integration makes them useful 
and necessary, replacing the increasingly notional sense of autarchy or self-
sufficiency of individual nation-states. (Kuzmics et al., 2020, 15)  
From a still wider perspective, the structure and force of these processes of 
differentiation, integration, and increasing complexity of social functions is 
strikingly similar to the processes of differentiation, integration, and increasing 
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complexity at the level of biological evolution, and the same conclusion is 
obvious from my essay on “Informalisation and Evolution: Four Phases in the 
Development of Steering Codes” (Wouters 2019b). It means that competition 
(pressuring towards differentiation) and co-operation (pressuring towards in-
terweaving or integration) are operative as major driving forces of/in both 
biological and social processes. 
9. Where Are We Now? 
In their book, Human Societies, Lenski and Lenski write: “During the early 
stages of the Industrial Revolution, it seemed […] that industrial societies 
would prove to be the least egalitarian of all” (1987, 313; also quoted in 
Wouters 1990). My study of trends and phases after the Anti-Colonial Revolu-
tion does not seem to justify a similarly forceful conclusion, but instead a more 
ambivalent one: on the one hand, a rise in global wealth and global income, and 
on the other, increasing inequality; the postcolonial world is becoming increas-
ingly less egalitarian, that is, with income and wealth as criteria.  
The World Inequality Report 201824 provides an extensive demonstration of 
this ambivalence, for example, in its “first estimates of how the growth in glob-
al income since 1980 has been distributed across the totality of the world popu-
lation,” it reports: “The poorest half of the global population has seen its in-
come grow significantly thanks to high growth in Asia. But the top 0.1% has 
captured as much growth as the bottom half of the world adult population since 
1980” (wir, 40). Inequality in wealth and income has increased: “the global top 
1 per cent of earners has captured twice as much of that growth as the 50 per 
cent of poorest individuals. The bottom 50 per cent has nevertheless enjoyed 
important growth rates” (ibid., 11). In 1990, 35 per cent of the world’s popula-
tion—1.8 billion—lived in extreme poverty. Half were in East Asia and Pacif-
ic, where the extreme poverty rate was 60 per cent, making it the poorest region 
at that time. In 2013, an estimated 766 million people, or 10.7 per cent of the 
world’s population, lived in extreme poverty, and Sub-Saharan Africa accounts 
for half the world’s extreme poor.25 
It is hard to compare, on the one hand, the balancing of constructive and de-
structive forces that accompanied global integration and disintegration in the 
decades in and after the Industrial Revolution, and on the other, the balancing 
of these forces after the post-colonial era of globalisation. In both periods, 
however, early integration processes lagged behind differentiation processes 
 
24  <http://wir2018.wid.world/>.  
25  <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgatlas/SDG-01-no-poverty.html>. 
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and were accompanied by many integration conflicts and part-processes of 
disintegration.  
With income and wealth as criteria, however, the question of whether func-
tional democratisation will continue must remain inconclusive and ambivalent. 
In my account of changes in global balances of constructive and destructive 
forces,26 the criteria of (in)equality in income and wealth have been supple-
mented with criteria such as human dignity and human value, and with others 
like the balances of power and dependence, of competition and cooperation, 
and of functional democratisation and informalisation. My account highlights 
integration processes on the one hand, and integration conflicts and disintegra-
tion on the other. From a global perspective, the processes of globalisation, 
civilisation, functional democratisation, and informalisation seem to have de-
veloped further in the same direction. The overall trends of competition and 
interweaving, and of differentiation and integration of social functions, have 
not stalled or changed direction, nor has a change occurred in the rise of growth 
rates of income and wealth among the world’s population. 
Both integration and disintegration processes are obvious in the European 
Union. For the moment, the Brits may dream of splendid isolation. They have 
left the EU, whatever that means, but together with the “America First” policy 
and the trade war between the USA and China, the Brexit Saga has put increas-
ingly strong pressures on its people and states to develop in the direction of 
further integration. A recent indication of this is the decision that the European 
Commission will include a commissioner for Defence and Industrial Politics. It 
shows that “European sovereignty” is becoming more viable as an argument, 
and that a European Ministry of Foreign Affairs is slowly developing. The 
European Council on Foreign Relations report that European voters “want to 
see the European Union come of age as a geopolitical actor and chart its own 
course.” Most EU citizens believe that they are living in an EU in which they 
can no longer rely on the US security guarantee, and that “there is a growing 
case for a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy in a dangerous, com-
petitive world” (Dennison 2019). It seems probable that, once outside the EU, 
the British dream of splendid isolation will conflict with the dream of a Global 
Britain and that both dreams will disappear in the face of the same “dangerous, 
competitive world” as the EU sees itself confronted with. 
In addition to disintegration and integration conflicts, the postcolonial era 
saw a new destructive force on a global level. Increasingly, clear indications 
emerged that humanity was endangering its own “environment” and life on 
 
26  Hans-Peter Waldhoff understands the tension between constructive and destructive forces 
to make up a central balance in the theory of civilising processes, and he states that his own 
study of Eros und Thanatos has its main focus on the balance between these forces, and 
how they are represented in the universe of symbols and function as part of them (2019, 
29). 
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earth. The danger implies that humans are losing control over “nature” and 
“natural” processes, thus putting enormous additional demands on their levels 
of social control and self-control. They are also enormous, because they in-
clude demands of a political nature that must be met and implemented on a 
global level of integration of nation-states, a level that barely exists and is 
under (America-First) attack.  
At present, the differentiation and integration of functions are more ad-
vanced in the world of commerce and finance than in the world of politics, 
where the integration of functions – the functions of nation-states in particular 
– seems to have proceeded at a slower pace. After reminding us that “it was not 
until the 1980s that state controls of capital movements were withdrawn” and 
how this resulted in “a revitalisation of British and US financial aristocracies 
with all the critical consequences of the current crisis,” sociologist Reinhard 
Blomert provides a preview of the future. He writes: “We may expect that the 
pendulum will swing to the other side, with politicians again able and compe-
tent to tame the financial aristocracy by regulating investment streams, and by 
reducing the mobility of capital and the opportunities for the creation of future 
bubbles” (2012) – and, in addition, by making them pay their taxes. 
Among other things, this will depend on the pace and extent to which people 
and politicians develop more of a global identification, prompting impulses 
toward social integration to gain in pace and catch up with processes of special-
isation or differentiation in all social activities. It also depends on whether, 
should integration conflicts intensify, and awareness of global dangers rise, 
more people will come to trust politicians over commercial people and finance 
oligarchs. They might, because “the people” may have a little control over 
politicians but their ability to control the moneycrats is far more limited. More-
over, politicians in nation-states, particularly in parliamentary democracies, are 
structurally obliged to be far more reliable and systematic in providing social 
protection via welfare-state arrangements than the alms and charity of the su-
perrich can ever be. The same goes for stimulating and organising the rise in 
social control and self-control needed to stop the dangers of humanity losing 
control over destructive “natural” processes. Among politicians as well as 
among “the people,” this function to provide both types of social protection 
presently seems a rather underestimated source of power, also as a potential 
crowbar to cut across national party lines and get to the level of international 
political relations. Even before these opportunities, dangers and conflicts rise to 
the political surface, sooner or later the necessity of coordinating the institu-
tional, national, and international multipolarity and reciprocal control among 
various groups of people will exert more and more pressure in the direction of 
further political integration. This necessity will rise as national and internation-
al interdependency networks rise to a critical level of differentiation, integra-
tion and complexity. Research, recently published in a special issue of this 
journal, “Emotions, Authority, and National Character: Historical-Processual 
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Perspectives,” attests to such a rise. Covering an area comprising Western, East 
Central, and South-eastern European countries, the Middle East, the USA, and 
Japan, the editors present as a major conclusion:  
Taken as a whole, our contributions attest to the development of greater Euro-
pean, or even global, webs of entanglement between nations-states, national 
we-images, and national identities, which serve to demonstrate […] a global 
process of functional democratisation that might one day come to restrict the 
power of its contemporary hegemon and its habitus of superiority. (Kuzmics 
et al., 2020, 37) 
The future of informalisation also depends, at least in part, on whether further 
globalisation brings the more egalitarian relations of further functional democ-
ratisation, because decreasing authoritarian relationships are important for 
social and psychic informalisation to flourish. However, in the relatively rich 
parts of the world, processes of informalisation are likely to continue their 
development in any case. We should expect integration conflicts and disinte-
gration processes, but if humanity does not destroy itself, or if it is not de-
stroyed entirely or in part by non-human intra- or extra-terrestrial catastrophes, 
we can expect the processes of globalisation, civilisation, functional democrati-
sation, and informalisation to develop further in the same direction. In other 
words, the direction of civilising processes has continued. 
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